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Public opinion, the Leopold Report, and the reform of federal predator control policy
JAMES W. FELDMAN, University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, Environmental Studies Program, 800
Algoma Boulevard, Oshkosh, WI 54901, USA feldmanj@uwosh.edu
Abstract: This paper explores the role of public opinion in a landmark shift in the federal predator

control program. In 1963, the Leopold Committee recommended extensive reform in the federal
predator control program, predicting that growing public support for the environmental movement
would force such a move if the government did not initiate a change. In the years following the publication
of the Leopold Report, the U.S. Division of Wildlife Services reformed its predator control program and
tried to improve its public image. Meanwhile, both environmentalists and ranchers fought to control
public opinion about the issue. The 1972 ban on predacides (poisons for predators) in federal predator
control programs resulted as much from the environmentalists’ ability to control public opinion as from
the changing scientific understanding of predators.

Key words: Compound 1080, environmental movement, human–wildlife conflict, Jack H. Berryman,
Leopold Report, predacides, predator control, Progressive conservation

Americans view coyotes (Canis latrans)
in at least 2 diﬀerent ways. One perspective
romanticizes the coyote: “If I could, I would
go to bed every night with coyote voices in
my ears and with them greet the gray light of
every dawn,” intones 1 nature writer (Olsen
1971a:256). The coyote’s haunting moon-howl
symbolizes the wilderness to campers in
America’s backcountry. Ranchers and farmers
who make their living oﬀ livestock, on the other
hand, view the coyote as a threat to economic
stability. In 1 rancher’s words: “[There is]
nothing romantic about a bunch of lambs with
their throats ripped out” (Spangler 1991:5).
For the first half of the twentieth century, this
latter view determined animal damage control
policies in the United States for coyotes and
other predatory animals. Federal agents
and ranchers used many techniques to stop
predators from preying on livestock, including
the liberal use of poisons in an eﬀort to suppress
predator populations across broad areas. Over
the course of the century, a growing ecological
understanding of predators raised questions
about this policy. The 1964 publication of
the U.S. Department of the Interior’s report,
Predator and Rodent Control in the United States,
more commonly known as the Leopold Report,
marked a turning point in the federal policy on
predator control (Leopold et al. 1964). It was a
battle over public perception, however, and not
just a changing understanding of ecology, that
motivated drastic change in federal policy.

quickly. The initial government role included
only conducting studies and demonstrations
of predator control tools and techniques. The
livestock industry, however, increasingly
demanded a larger federal program, and
Congress responded to this pressure in 1915
by allocating $125,000 specifically for predator
control to the U.S. Bureau of Biological Survey
(BBS), an agency housed in the U.S. Department
of Agriculture, to deal with predatory animals
that preyed on livestock (Di Silvestro 1985,
Hawthorne et al. 1999). Initial predator control
had relied on hunting and trapping, but the
BBS introduced poisons as an additional
method. With a large amount of rangeland to
cover, bait stations—horse quarters laced with
strychnine and set out for scavenging wolves
(Canis lupus) and coyotes to find—proved an
eﬀective technique. Traps caught only 1 animal
at a time; poisons killed multiple predators that
consumed poisoned bait at the stations. In 1920,
the BBS began systematic experimentation
to improve the eﬀectiveness of poisons as a
control tool (Hawthorne et al. 1999). By the
mid-1920s, the federal program supported
the killing of approximately 35,000 coyotes a
year. The Great Depression increased pressure
for more extensive control, and World War II
rationing on steel and ammunition hastened
the shift from trapping and hunting to the use
of poisons (Dunlap 1988, Mighetto 1991).

Rationale for predator control grew out
of the ideas of Progressive Era conservation.
Establishing the federal predator
Environmental historians have developed a
control program
very specific meaning of the term progressive
The federal government first became conservation. At the turn of the nineteenth
involved in predator control in the early century, Americans began to manage—as
twentieth century, and the program grew opposed to simply use—their natural resources.

Spring 2007

Feldman

113

The overarching ideology of conservation
was the application of scientific principles to
resource management to ensure continued
yield of resources like timber, minerals, and
livestock. Samuel Hays, the leading historian
of the conservation movement, identified “the
concept of planned and eﬃcient progress” as
the heart of the conservation idea (Hays 1959:5).
In my article, the term conservation is used in
this historical sense. Proponents of conservation
science sought to replace the view of the
environment as an opponent to be conquered
that had guided early American encounters
with the natural world. Killing predators was
Coyote on the prowl.
easily justified as a means for maximizing both
rangeland and wildlife resources (Nash 1982, when the BBS requested $1 million for predator
Worster 1985).
control (MacIntyre 1982).
The application of Progressive conservation
The Great Depression quashed these
principles to wildlife produced the science of
protests, and between 1930 and 1950 the
game management and early applications of federal commitment to predator control
the new science further depreciated the value steadily increased. In 1931, Congress passed
of predators. Wildlife conservation focused on the National Animal Damage Control Act,
game species as a resource, and predators killed legislation directing the government to
deer (Odocoileus spp.) and pronghorn antelope “conduct campaigns for the destruction or
(Antilocapra americana), as well as domestic control of (predatory) animals” (U.S. Public
livestock. The increasingly powerful sports- Law 776). This act expanded the government
man’s clubs threw in their lot with ranchers role in predator control, authorizing the use of
in calls for predator control. A young U.S. federal funds and personnel on private lands.
Forest Service employee named Aldo Leopold The act remains a key foundation for modern
emerged as one of the leading theoreticians animal damage control eﬀorts (Di Silvestro
of the new science of wildlife management. 1985). During 1934, Congress assessed fees for
Leopold had long been a proponent of grazing on public lands, solidifying the federal
predator control. In 1920, he had called for the responsibility to control predators. In 1939, the
extermination of wolves and mountain lions predator control program—now carried out by
(Felis concolor) throughout the West. Later in the the Division of Predator and Rodent Control
century, Leopold’s ideas about wildlife manage- (PARC)—moved to the U.S. Department of
ment and predator control altered drastically. the Interior. This division enjoyed consistent
Leopold’s transforming attitude toward support both in Washington and on the western
predators serve as a signpost for changes in range, demonstrated by its budget of more
American attitudes in general (Worster 1985, than $1 million cooperatively provided by the
Dunlap 1988, Leopold 1990, Mighetto 1991). government and by western livestock interests
In the early twentieth century, though, federal (Cain et al. 1972, MacIntyre 1982). Numbers of
predator control had both political and scientific coyotes taken by the federal program reached
support.
all-time highs during World War II, topping
The use of predacides (poisons for predators)
sparked protests against the predator control
program. In 1923, some scientists voiced
the first significant criticism against the BBS,
decrying what they label as “modern poison
warfare”(Worster 1985) without research into
the environmental consequences of poison use.
These scientists worried about nontarget kills,
meaning fatalities, to American badgers (Taxidea
taxus), striped skunks (Mephitis mephitis), bald
eagles (Haliaeetus leucocephalus), golden eagles
(Aguila chrysaetos), and other animals that fed at
the bait stations that were set out to kill coyotes
and wolves. These objections escalated in 1930,

out at 111,076 recorded in 1942 (Cain et al.
1972). Other large predators—such as wolves,
mountain lions, and grizzly bears (Ursus
arctos)—had been banished to the most isolated
parts of the West or extirpated altogether.
During this era, the federal animal damage
control program expanded in relative obscurity,
with little formal opposition or public notice
(Miller 1999).
In 1947, PARC introduced a new predacide—
sodium fluoroacetate, or Compound 1080
for short. Compound 1080 oﬀered many
advantages. A colorless, tasteless, odorless
poison, it proved highly toxic to canids and
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A
coyote
finds
its
victim.

rodents, the two chief targets of control. A mere
1.6 grams of the poison rendered 100 pounds of
horsemeat lethal to coyotes. This new predacide
quickly became PARC’s preferred control tool.
But Compound 1080 also drew immediate and
constant criticism from opponents of predator
control for its dangers to humans (there is no
known antidote), for the inhumanity of the
convulsions it induced in animals, and for its
possible dangers to the environment (Howard
and Schmidt 1984, Dunlap 1988).
Because of the risks associated with
Compound 1080, PARC implemented strict
restrictions on the new poison. These included:
use only in the sparsely populated West; use
only where predation posed a major problem
and other methods had failed; use only in bait
stations and only 1 station per 93.2 km2; and
placement of bait stations away from roads,
developments, and water sources (Dunlap
1988). Some scholars have suggested that the
scientists who first researched Compound 1080
widely publicized the toxin’s risks to scare
untrained people from using it, as no eﬀective
regulatory system existed at the time. Later
critics of the poison called upon this publicity
in their campaign to limit its use (Howard and
Schmidt 1984).
During the first half of the twentieth century,
federal predator control operations expanded
gradually. One interpretation of the growth of
this program holds that the western ranching
interests dominated PARC and that predator
control depended on ranchers’whims rather than
objective decision making. The establishment
of cooperative funding mechanisms—money
from states, counties, and local ranching
associations directly paid to PARC for its
services—aided this development. In 1940, for
example, the federal government contributed
only $398,360 for PARC’s predator control
activities, whereas cooperative funds totaled
$632,115 (Cain et al. 1972). This cooperation
also developed from the positions of western
representatives on powerful U.S. congressional
committees, the high demand for meat during
World War II, and the absence of consistent
opposition to predator control (MacIntyre 1982).
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Wool grower involvement in predator policies
coincided with a wider suspicion that ranching
interests had subjected the entire grazing
system to their will. As federal predator control
became more controversial, opponents of the
program pointed to the ranchers’ influence as
one of the system’s gravest problems (Culhane
1981, Brunson and Kennedy 1995).
The increasing role of the federal government
in predator control became controversial, as
well. Traditionally, state wildlife agencies
managed resident wildlife, whereas the
responsibility for migratory animals fell to the
federal government. Under which class did
coyotes fall? People encouraging an increased
federal role claimed that coyotes moved
across state borders and therefore constituted
migratory wildlife. Those opposed to federal
involvement argued that coyotes’ territorial
nature made them resident wildlife and a state
responsibility. Others believed that predators
kept ranchers from using federal land for
grazing, thereby reducing the value of public
lands and threatening rural economies. Another
dispute focused on the beneficiaries of control:
state management brought the most eﬀective
response to local needs, but wildlife belonged
to the general public as public resources, not
just to the local community. These questions
concerned federal wildlife management in
general, not just predator policies (Cummings
1972, U.S. Congress 1972, Wagner 1972, Wagner
1975).
The ambiguous nature of wildlife responsibility has been a persistent issue in the history
of predator control. All of the groups interested
in control—ranchers, conservationists, federal
agents, and scientists—have exploited the
uncertainty, moving toward or away from
increased federal control depending on specific
situations and desired goals. The lasting eﬀect
of the state/federal dilemma has been to keep
the door to controversy ajar. This uncertainty
also ensured that public opinion about the role
of predator control would become increasingly
important (Bean 1978, Tober 1981, Tober 1989).
On the practical level, the various federal
agencies that have carried out predator control
have dealt with the responsibility dilemma by
negotiating cooperative agreements with the
states (Cain et al. 1972). The head of the federal
program, Jack H. Berryman, summed up the
debate in 1970:
Our relationship with the States goes
beyond the rather simplistic and arbitrary
migratory-resident species concept (which
we all ignore most of the time anyway)
and the present states’ rights commotion.
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The animal control eﬀort is a kind of
partnership, although we do indeed need
to enjoy active and open support when
rendering services needed and requested
by the States. If this is not the case, we
should pull out entirely... (J. H. Berryman,
Division of Wildlife Services, unpublished
report 1970).

explained, “simply enlarges the boundaries
of the community to include soils, waters,
plants, and animals, or collectively the land.”
Relationships with nature should be determined
“in terms of what is ethically and aesthetically
right, as well as what is economically expedient”
(Leopold 1949:239). Scholars and activists
consider Leopold one of the founders of modern
Through these agreements, the government environmentalism. Although not widely read
secured authority to carry out its program, in his own time, by the late 1960s Leopold had
emerged as a prophet of the environmental
regardless of where actual responsibility fell.
movement with his 1949 collection of essays, A
Change in American attitudes
Sand County Almanac, as one of the movement’s
most important texts (Worster 1985, Gray
toward predators
While the federal predator program grew, 1993).
the attitudes of the American people toward
Attitudes towards wildlife changed with
wildlife and wild places changed. If predator wider shifts in the perceptions of the natural
policies prior to 1950 grew out of conservation, world. Predators—coyotes and especially
in the second half of the century they changed wolves—served as symbols of the savage
in response to the ideas of environmentalism. wilderness that early Americans had sought to
As with conservation, environmental
historians consider the emergence of
environmentalism as a specific historical
event, albeit one less easily defined.
Environmentalism fused several diﬀerent
cultural trends into a new perspective
on nature: the desire to preserve (as
opposed to conserve) natural resources,
increased interest in outdoor recreation,
an ecological perspective on the
relationships between humans and other
organisms, and heightened attention to
the impact of pollution on the natural
world.
Preservation demanded natural resource management not because of the Wolf pack.
economic opportunities in nature, but
specifically because of nature’s non-economic tame. Progressive Era wildlife managers saw
values. This ideology had been around for a the predator in economic terms, as a threat to
while, with philosophers like John Muir and deer and livestock. In preservation ideology,
battles like the one in the early twentieth century however, the predator could be appreciated
over the Hetch Hetchy Dam outside of San for the aesthetic qualities it brought to the
Francisco. However, few people subscribed to environment and for its own inherent value.
these beliefs, and few of these beliefs translated Aesthetic appreciation of coyotes and wolves
into policy. But the economic boom of the 1950s developed around its moon-howl (Dunlap 1988,
provided room for attitudes to change. With Mighetto 1991). “[The howl] is inextricably
financial security came leisure time, disposable associated with the romance of the West, and
income, and ability to shed the dollar-dominated the sense of open space and wildness of those
view of nature. Increasing calls by middle-class areas,” explained 1 admirer (U.S. Congress
Americans for wilderness—lands protected 1972:274). The bark of the coyote could be as
from the degradations of resource extraction— valuable as its bite.
exemplify this shift (Nash 1982, Dunlap 1988,
The developing science of ecology fostered
Cawley 1993).
transforming attitudes about wildlife and
Aldo Leopold’s emerging ideas foreshadowed also about predator control. During the midthese changes. By the time of his death in 1948, twentieth century, ecologists demonstrated with
Leopold had left his earlier ideas of economic increasing confidence the interrelationships
management behind and embraced what he and mutual dependence among all living
termed a “land ethic.” This philosophy, he things. The study of predation matured as well,
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establishing the importance of predators in
the biotic community. Opponents of predator
control could and did argue that removing
predators from the wild knocked the natural
system into an unnatural state of imbalance
(Nash 1982, Dunlap 1983, Worster 1985).
Concern for animal rights and its less
radical and more widely-supported sister
idea, animal welfare, also matured during this
time. Animal rights activists rallied around
the idea that animals have moral standing,
and they questioned the right of humans
to inflict pain on other animals. The animal
welfare movement simply sought to reduce
animal pain and avoid unnecessary suﬀering
(Schmidt 1990). Groups concerned with
animal welfare formed around the turn of the
nineteenth century; in 1925, the Anti-Steel
Trap League began targeting the government’s
predator program. As the government started
to use more poison, animal welfare activists
redirected their focus as well. Compound 1080,
which attacked the coyote’s nervous system and
induced violent convulsions, became a constant
target of protests for its cruelty and inhumanity.
Although animal rights activists did protest
predator control, animal welfare generated
more widespread concern (Mighetto 1991).
Changing perceptions of animals and
wilderness contributed to growing rifts in the
American social fabric. The controversy over
what to do with predators frequently divided
along East/West and rural/urban lines. The
predator control dispute split the East and
the West simply because most of the ranchers,
sheep, and coyotes lived in the West and most
of predator control’s opponents lived in the
East. Westerners resented eastern intrusion,
and they accused easterners of imperialism.
Although the federal government—a frequent
target of western unrest—provided the funding
and manpower for predator management, the
ranchers determined the frequency and intensity
of control. In western eyes, regulation of the
poisoning program would place unacceptable
restrictions on range management.
The urban/rural split developed gradually
during the twentieth century, but became
more noticeable during the 1950s. During
World War II, rural America experienced
the beginnings of the production revolution.
Expanding mechanization and the increasing
use of pesticides decreased the number of
people necessary for agricultural production.
Young people migrated from the rural
areas—particularly those with resource-based
economies—to the cities. The rural exodus
accelerated in the 1950s and 1960s. Whereas
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23% of Americans lived on farms in 1950,
by 1970 less than 5% did. With decreasing
population and deflating morale, many rural
American communities faltered (Brunson and
Kennedy 1995, Danbom 1995). These changing
demographics directly aﬀected the sheep
industry. As ranchers’ children left for the cities,
sheep operations folded across the West. In
1950, 200,000 ranchers ran sheep; by 1972, the
number had fallen to 59,700. Wool growers felt
their way of life was dying out (Schueler 1991).
Conversely, urban America experienced
unprecedented growth during the same
period. With the economic boom of the 1950s,
bank accounts and leisure time increased for
many urbanites. Interest in outdoor recreation
exploded as people sought relief from the
dirty, congested cities. They looked to the less
crowded, less developed rural areas to meet
the demand. Urbanites spearheaded the new
environmental movement, seeking what they
perceived as an ecologically balanced, pristine
wilderness and an outlet for their recreational
interests (Hays 1987, Brunson and Kennedy
1995).
These developments brought urban and rural
America into conflict. Urban recreationists’
outdoor activities “clashed frequently with
the customs, economic objectives, and pace
of life” of rural communities, explained 1
scholar (Hays 1987:288). City dwellers brought
their new set of environmental values to
the countryside. Removed from the direct
economic consequences of environmental
regulation, they called for the preservation of
wilderness areas and restrictions on ecologically
destructive practices like pesticide application.
Rural Americans consistently opposed these
initiatives (Brunson and Kennedy 1995).
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring focused national attention on the dangers of pesticides
(Carson 1962). Many historians have pointed
to the 1962 best seller as the first step in the
modern environmental movement. Carson’s
book called attention to concepts like the web
of life and underlined the dangers of toxic
substances in the environment. Concern about
toxic pollutants emerged as a central theme
of the environmental movement in the 1960s.
While Carson publicized the plight of backyard
songbirds, other authors focused on predators
and wildlife. In 1963, Farley Mowat published
Never Cry Wolf, a record of his observations of a
Canadian wolf family (Mowat 1963). Although
ecologists have disputed the scientific value and
accuracy of Never Cry Wolf, the book became a
best seller and helped to change many people’s
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inherent interest and value to the people
of the United States. Basic policy therefore
should be one of husbandry of all forms of
wildlife.
2) At the same time, local population control
is an essential part of a management policy,
where a species is causing significant
damage to other resources or crops, or
where it endangers human health or
safety. Control should be limited to the
troublesome species, preferably to the
troublesome individuals, and in any event
to the localities where substantial damage
or danger exists (Leopold et al. 1964:3).

minds about the value of predators. Both of
these books directed attention once more to
dangerous uses of pesticides, predacides, and
These basic premises reflect the principles of
other poisons, and also to the federal use of
the 2 most important ideologies of twentieththese tools in the predator control program
century resource management: conservation
(Dunlap 1983).
and preservation.

Reforming predator control:
the Leopold Report and its aftermath

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, protests
against the predator control program picked up
again. Some critics called only for a reassessment
of the program; others questioned whether it
was necessary at all. Changing attitudes toward
wildlife and increasing calls for nature protection
motivated these protests. In 1963, U.S. Secretary
of the Interior Stewart Udall called for a review
of the predator program to help answer the
criticisms and to make recommendations for
needed changes. The Special Advisory Board
on Wildlife Management had been created in
1962 to help the secretary administer the most
diﬃcult wildlife management situations. The
board consisted of 5 eminent wildlife biologists,
and is usually known as the Leopold Committee,
after chair A. Starker Leopold (Aldo Leopold’s
son). The committee’s 1964 report on predator
control, known as the Leopold Report, sparked
a flurry of changes in the federal predator
control program (U.S. Congress 1966). Public
perception of these changes proved to be just
as important as the changes themselves.

The scientists on the Leopold Committee
oﬀered a set of recommendations to improve the
federal program. They suggested a permanent
advisory board made up of representatives
of all parties interested in control to oversee
the program. They called for a reassessment
by PARC of its own goals in light of the
American public’s changing attitudes toward
wildlife and suggested a name change for the
division to reflect the new philosophy. They
recommended an amplified research program
focusing on species-specific and nonlethal
methods. Suggestions on PARC operations
included restricting the program in the western
states. With regard to poisons, the Leopold
scientists concluded that Compound 1080 was
the most eﬃcient method for control on the
western range, and that when properly applied,
it could be safe, humane, and eﬀective. But, the
scientists pointed out, abuse of Compound
1080 did occur; they recommended increased
federal controls over its use, as well as over
the use of other predacides. The Leopold
committee included a bit of political prescience
in its report:

The Leopold Report lambasted the existing
Unless the government control program
federal control program. “It is the unanimous
undergoes a drastic and critical internal
opinion of this Board that control as actually
revision of operational objectives and
practiced is considerably in excess of the amount
procedures, an even more drastic revision
that can be justified in terms of total public
will sooner or later be forced by the public,
interest” (Leopold et al. 1964:3). The committee
with possible curtailment of the control
had studied all aspects of the PARC program:
functions which we concur are locally
financing, criteria for control, professionalism of
important (Leopold et al. 1964:18).
federal agents, methodology, research agendas,
public health, and predator, rodent, and bird
Secretary Udall took the committee’s
control. The Leopold Committee scientists
recommendations
to heart. On 16 June 1965,
based their report on 2 basic premises:
after 15 months of deliberations and public
1) All native animals are resources of
comment, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior
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announced the acceptance of the Leopold
Report as a “general guidepost” for Interior
Department policy (U.S. Congress 1966). He
oﬀered assurances to wool growers that they
would not be forgotten: “We have no intention
of abandoning our responsibility in the control
of damage by pest species when it is clear
that the Department’s assistance is needed.”
He added, however, that “[a]t the same time,
the Department has a much wider interest in
wildlife, including the general public interest”
(J. H. Berryman, Wildlife Services Progress
unpublished report 1969 [hereafter referred to
as Wildlife Services Progress 1969]).
Over the next 5 years, a spring cleaning of
sorts occurred at the U.S. Department of the
Interior’s predator control division. Policies,
names, terms, titles, and philosophies were
replaced or changed. Aﬀected parties watched
the debris flying from the closet with interest.
“[Environmentalists] thought we were dragging
our feet, wool growers thought we were
going ape, and they really kept the pressure
on,” remembers Jack H. Berryman, head of
the government program at the time (J. H.
Berryman, personal communication, 1996).
Changes took place at 2 levels; the federal
program received cosmetic surgery designed
to improve public relations as well as deeper
changes in philosophy and policy.
Everyone involved in the predator control
house cleaning recognized the importance of
public perception. A public outcry had spurred
the Leopold Report and its recommendations
in the first place; the federal policy needed to
respect this public concern. “We recommend that
each step in implementing the [new predator
control] policy be accompanied by news
coverage to secure maximum understanding
of the program and establish a new ‘image’”
(Wildlife Services Progress 1969, Appendix
3:5). Between 1965 and 1969, in an eﬀort to
win public support, the U.S. Department
of the Interior circulated 250 pamphlets
and oﬀered 73 formal talks in addition to
routine newsletters and announcements
(Wildlife Services Progress 1969).

Human–Wildlife Conflicts 1(1)

H. Berryman came aboard to head the DWS, a
U.S. Department of the Interior news release
emphasized that he had been an associate
professor at Utah State University and that he
had served as the immediate past president of
The Wildlife Society. These changes reflected
the importance of public opinion and approval
(Wildlife Services Progress 1969).
Berryman quickly began the makeover of the
predator control program. Titles of DWS field
operatives changed from the sinister “Control
Agents” to the innocuous “District Field
Assistants” (National Archives, Record Group
22, unpublished correspondence, August 24,
1965). The Washington oﬃce recognized that
“there is a need for upgrading the appearance
of field personnel” to overcome the image of
predator control specialists as “gopher chokers”
and “blood-thirsty killers”; DWS employees
were issued field uniforms and provided
instruction on public relations (National
Archives, Record Group 22, unpublished
correspondence, August 27, 1965). Even the
term-inology of control changed.
Obviously, public acceptance is essential
if we are to continue to meet our animal
control responsibilities. Much of the
terminology that has been used over the
years is for various reasons now distasteful
to some segments of the public and there
is a need for a careful review of verbal
and written expressions. (unpublished
correspondence, National Archives, Record
Group 22, October 18, 1965)
“Poison” became “toxicant” or “chemical
compound”; “kill” became “reduction” or
“removal” (National Archives, Record Group
22, unpublished correspondence, October 18,
1965). Berryman instructed DWS operatives to
stop thinking about animals as “good,” “bad,”

As a part of these changes, the federal
predator control program received a
new name and a new head in 1965. The
U.S. Division of Predator and Rodent
Control became the U.S. Division of
Wildlife Services (DWS) to highlight the
new direction of the federal program.
New responsibilities included “Wildlife
Enhance-ment” and “Pesticide AppraisalMonitoring,” both protection (as opposed
to control) oriented functions. When Jack Red fox cub.
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“pests,” “detrimental,” and “beneficial,” and in which we must live” (National Archives,
instead recognize that all species, at 1 time Record Group 22, unpublished correspondence,
or another, could fit all of these descriptions August 9, 1968).
(“Wildlife Services Progress” 1969, personal
Practices changed in the field, too. DWS agents
communication 1996).
decreased their use of poisons and traps, which
Agents working for PARC had received led to a decrease in total take of animals. They
criticism for being unprofessional and increased the use of aircraft and introduced
uneducated; Berryman professionalized the mobile forces that could quickly respond to
division. DWS recruited people trained in areas with serious predator problems. The
wildlife management. By 1969, 26 of 33 state division tried to increase control in high-sheep
supervisors had been replaced, and 80% of DWS areas and halt it in nonsheep areas, hoping to
personnel had college degrees—a significant increase coyote populations but keep the level
increase over earlier years (Wildlife Services of depredation constant (Wildlife Services
Progress 1969).
Progress 1969).
Oﬃcials at DWS also implemented stricter
The changes implemented by DWS between
1965 and 1969 were not merely cosmetic. controls on the use of poisons, particularly
Progressive conservation had provided the Compound 1080. They reevaluated the
ideology for predator control in the first half placement of all bait stations and withdrew
of the twentieth century. This ideology had some of them from use. They sought formal
become less relevant, and the DWS needed approval of land users and district, state, and
to acknowledge this change. The agency regional managers before setting out the statransformed its guiding philosophy, always tions. From 1965 to 1969, the use of Compound
1080 baits declined 21%, strychnine use fell 22%,
with an eye to public opinion.
and use of thallium sulfate (perhaps the most
dangerous and nonselective of the predacides
This has been no simple reorganization or
then employed) was virtually eliminated
policy redirection. What has really been
(Wildlife Services Progress 1969).
at stake is a fundamental change in the
conservation movement—a change in the
The battle for public opinion
way we view and deal with animals that
For all the commotion at DWS between
become troublesome. We are not dealing
1965 and 1969, the changes failed. Although
simply with a change in a Federal bureau,
significant advances had been made both in
but a change in public attitudes among
Washington and in the field, the new policy
cooperators and cooperating agencies—
faltered because it did not win public support.
in attitudes that touch emotions and
Criticism of the program died down for a few
pocketbooks (Wildlife Services Progress
years, but by the late 1960s, environmentalists
1969:1).
were criticizing DWS and its predator control
program as never before. Environmentalists,
The division adopted the Leopold Report’s DWS agents, and wool growers struggled
guiding principles: all animals have a right over a variety of concerns: poison use, wool
to exist, but control is necessary in certain grower influence on policy, the conservation/
situations.
preservation debate, and animal welfare. In
In April 1967, DWS translated its philosophy short, the issues that had been simmering for
into a new policy titled “Man and Wildlife,” the previous 50 years boiled over.
the first oﬃcial policy statement issued in the
A dramatic increase in the American public’s
history of federal predator control. Division environmental awareness set up the next
oﬃcials took painstaking steps to ensure that round of predator control debates. Between
their new policy met public approval (Wildlife 1969 and 1971, concern for the environment
Services Progress 1969). They circulated a burst upon the national scene. A survey of
draft to 30 land-managing agencies, livestock editorials conducted in September 1971 in 5
associations, environmental groups, and major newspapers found that the environment
others—“everybody and his brother,” according was the most important domestic issue. The
to Berryman—and incorporated virtually all of new awareness found expression in April 1970
their comments and suggestions in the final with the celebration of Earth Day. Hundreds of
draft (Wildlife Services Progress 1969, appendix thousands of people paraded along the streets
11). Secretary Udall described the policy as “a of Washington, D.C., New York, and other
firm resolve that in protecting the interest of cities, demanding a more responsible approach
man, we will not jeopardize the environment to nature. College campuses also emerged as
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The barrage of negative press for predator
centers of protest (Spencer 1972, Whitaker 1976,
control continued. In March 1971, the journalist
Steinberg 2002).
Interest in predator control rose with these Jack Olsen published a series of incendiary
larger movements, but the new protests articles collectively titled “The Poisoning of the
West” in the widely read sports weekly, Sports
diﬀered from previous complaints. For the first
Illustrated. Olsen voiced loud concerns about
time, critics of the program were able to carry
the DWS coyote control program:
their message to the general public outside the
memberships of environmental organizations. “Were all these [animal] deaths necessary?
In 1969, for example, NBC aired a prime-time Were they ecologically justified? Or were they
documentary titled “The Wolf Me” that was
viewed by 40 million people. The documentary
detailed the practice of bounty hunting for
wolves in Alaska and included grisly scenes of
hunters eating raw wolf flesh. One author in
Defenders of Wildlife News wrote:
The spectacle of that pot-bellied, waﬄebottomed, all-American sportsman with his
twelve-gauge automatic shotgun, maiming,
crippling, and sometimes killing outright
the harmless, family-oriented wolves in
deep snow from a hovering helicopter,
boiled the collective blood of millions of
Americans... (Murray 1972:251).
Over 1,600 letters of protest poured in to
DWS oﬃces and 700 more to the oﬃce of the
governor of Alaska concerning the predator
control program as well as Alaskan wolf
hunting (National Archives, Record Group
22, unpublished correspondence, February 6,
1970). In June 1970, the New Yorker published a
40-page article detailing the eﬀects of the DWS
prairie dog control program on the endangered
black-footed ferret (Mustela nigripes). Prairie
dog control relied on Compound 1080,
which the author Faith McNulty labeled “a
Hiroshima-like disaster” (McNulty 1970). In
1971, McNulty published a book detailing the
situation. Environmentalists had succeeded
in broadcasting their concerns about predator
control and Compound 1080 in the popular
media.
Supporters of the predator control program
claimed that the wolf-eating scenes were
staged. The hunter filmed eating wolf meat in
“The Wolf Men” insisted that the whole incident
was a joke; he had been hamming it up for the
cameras. The documentary had played on the
emotions of uninformed viewers, “almost all of
whom have grown up with a Bambi complex
about wild game—naturally the scenes
provoked an angry protest against hunting
wolves” (National Wool Grower 1971:6). These
attempted rebuttals did little to stem the letters
of protest that poured into the DWS oﬃce in
Washington, D.C. (J. H. Berryman, personal
communication, September 25, 1996).

Fox stalking at night.

part of a runaway killing program that years ago
lost its scientific justification and now rushes on
like an unbraked train?” (Olsen 1971b:37)
Poison, Olsen coldly explained, “is turning
the tortured rangelands into a reeking abattoir
of dead and dying wildlife and contaminated
watersheds.” Olsen attacked the ranchers and
the DWS:
Unless there are massive changes, unless
the livestock lobbies of the West and the
federal poisoners give up their myths
and prejudices, the day must come when
the last weak and sickened coyote will
drag himself to his feet and lift his voice
to the skies, and there will be no answer
(1971b:37).
By publishing in Sports Illustrated, Olsen
reached a group of readers not necessarily
associated with the environmental movement.
Later in 1971, Olsen expanded his exposé
into a book provocatively entitled Slaughter
the Animals, Poison the Earth. This diﬀered
little in substance from the articles, although
it presented the accusations in greater detail
(Olsen 1971a). Slaughter the Animals received
positive reviews in the mainstream press.
Indeed, some compared it to Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring (Amory 1971).
Olsen and other protesters tapped into the
widespread public awareness of ecology. They
argued that no scientific studies had proven the
wool growers’ claims about the threat predators
posed to sheep and lambs, suggesting instead
that coyotes preferred rabbits, mice, and other
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forest rodents (Callison 1971, Free 1971). The lead to wider support for their demands for
protesters pointed repeatedly to the findings of drastic change in the federal predator control
the Leopold Report to uphold their position.
program.
If Leopold and the other scientists
are correct—if the land is indeed one
organism and there is a total and critical
interdependence among all living
things—then the deliberate poisoning of
vast areas of the United States will have
been a long stride toward the end of life
as it is known on the North American
continent (Olsen 1971a:33).

Opponents of the program asked the
American public to depart from their traditional
ideas about nature. They wanted to leave the
older ideas of conservation behind and view the
environment in “ethical rather than economic
terms” (Nash 1982:254). In this new way of
thinking, considerations for animal suﬀering
and the web of life took precedence over food
production and economic eﬃciency. But not all
Americans embraced this new perspective.

Environmentalists used the science of ecology
The wool growers had diﬃculty battling
to support their criticisms of predator control in
a way that would not have been possible earlier environmentalists for the support of the general
public. “All we have to do is get the story out ....
in the century (Dunlap 1983).
The people we must reach are the consumers
Animal welfare activists jumped into the fray, of America, and they’re out there right now
turning up the pressure for change in predator listening to propaganda from the other side”
programs. Cleveland Amory, president of the (Shepard 1971:16). Despite their best attempts,
anticruelty organization Fund for Animals, however, the wool growers failed. They asked
explained:
NBC for the opportunity to run an equal-time
documentary to respond to the accusations
leveled against them in “The Wolf Men”; NBC
We do not feel we can give every animal
rebuﬀed them (National Wool Grower 1970).
on this earth a decent life, but we do
They tried to write articles in response to Olsen’s
feel the least we can do in an age when
allegations but could not get one published
we can get to the moon is give them a
in a periodical with wide circulation (Utah
decent death. Now we are going to rule
Wool Growers Association papers, Merrill
out certain kinds of death as indecent ....
Library, Utah State University, unpublished
Poisoning is an indecent death to a wild
correspondence, 1971). With no place else to
animal .... [I]f we could show on television
go, the stockmen made their arguments in
a coyote dying of thallium or 1080 ... we
association publications, in farming tabloids,
would eventually get poison outlawed
and in the local newspapers of western towns.
for good (U.S. Congress 1971:178–179).
If New Yorkers could not read these articles, the
wool growers would reach out to the people of
Animal welfare activists accepted the the rural West.
necessity for control, but wanted it done in a
The rural populace resented urban interhumane manner.
ference. The environmentalists’ calls for a ban
To capture the support of the wider public, on poison use seemed another example of an allenvironmentalists pointed out that tax money too-familiar pattern. Just as ecologists presumed
funded the interests of a very small number of all ranchers were ignorant of modern science,
ranchers. The question of federal responsibility wool growers stereotyped environmentalists
for wildlife management became an important as New York urbanites unfamiliar with a hard
part of such criticisms. “Remember, since most day’s work or with the necessities of agriculture.
of it is public land, and your taxes pay the The sheepmen invited “all those who have
poisoners, what they’re doing is poisoning never experienced the harshness of agricultural
your animals on your land with your money” production to learn the ranchers’ and farmers’
(Amory 1971:20). Ranchers corralled tax dollars side of the story before they promote ‘imfor such self-serving programs, critics argued, practical schemes’ to correct the ill[s] of food
because livestock interests had too much power and fiber production” (Johnson 1971:19–20).
over western legislatures and federal agencies. Having more sympathy for coyotes than for
Environmentalists fingered DWS as a guilty sheep seemed not only financially unwise,
party. “No Federal agency can possibly be but simply ludicrous. The stockmen viewed
more abject in its ‘clientism’ to special economic coyote depredations as the rural equivalent to
interests than [DWS] in dealing with the sheep the inner-city subway mugging. City dwellers
industry” (Frome 1971:44). Environmentalists had policemen for protection; why should
hoped that pocketbook arguments would sheepmen be defenseless (Stoddard 1971)?
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Ranchers also resented being cast as people
ignorant in the ways of nature. Ranchers
believed that environmentalists exaggerated
the risks of ecological disaster from predator
control. And, the sheepmen asked, who knew
the environment better than the people who
worked on the range? Certainly not a bunch of
New Yorkers.
The wool grower’s basic business deals
with sustaining life. To survive he must
understand and cooperate with the forces
of nature. He spends more time in the
wilderness observing the interactions of
nature in one year than most people spend
in a lifetime (Noh 1970:25).

Human–Wildlife Conflicts 1(1)

backs” (Parker 1972:22).
Ranchers viewed poisons as a vital tool
for the health of their industry. They grew
particularly frustrated with the outcry over
Compound 1080. They regarded it as their most
eﬀective technique and credited it with saving
the American sheep industry from extinction.
“In spite of 1080’s poor reputation with the
public, much of this is based on misinformation
or deliberate distortion of its characteristics, it
... is a chemical which could be used selectively
for control of coyotes ....” (Cummings 1971:22).
The wool growers felt the occasional nontarget
death a small price to pay for the continued
viability of their industry and their way of life
(National Wool Grower 1972).

Ranchers could do a better job “maintaining
Two sets of attitudes about wild lands
the environment than all the fly-by-night
and
wildlife came into contest over predator
campaigns to ‘restore nature’s balance’—
control
policies, and specifically over the use
whatever that precisely is” (Armstrong
of Compound 1080. Ranchers, “committed
1971:12).
to making the land productive,” viewed
Ranchers wanted to use economics, not Compound 1080 as an economic technology
ecology, to determine control, as they had (Dunlap 1988:112). Preservationists pointed to
been doing for most of the century. The wool Compound 1080 as an example of “reckless
growers relied on statistics, like the number of disregard for the material world on which we
sheep lost each year to predator depredation, to [depend]” (Dunlap 1988:112). Predator control
justify control. The predator control program became such a volatile issue in part because of
had functioned for years without a formalized the clash in values. The tremendous growth
reporting system. Environmentalists continually of environmental awareness in the late 1960s
accused the ranchers of inflating their losses— forced the conflict of values out into the open.
“crying coyote”—to garner federal support (New The fact that predator control divided so neatly
York Times 1972). DWS had implemented a along battle lines already drawn between the
documentation system during the post-Leopold East and the West and between urban and rural
Report make-over, and stockmen’s magazines America stoked the fire. Divergent opinions
urged ranchers to report their losses. “On file on predator control exacerbated preexisting
with the proper [oﬃce], the record becomes a notions of ignorant, backwoods ranchers and
matter of statistics, compiled by the agency that emotional, urban environmentalists.
will assist us in case of adverse legislation or of
Conclusion: changes in the federal
support with favorable legislation on predator
predator control policy
control” (Utah Wool Grower 1971:1).
In the end, the wool growers lost the battle for
The wool growers utilized such statistics, as
well as the economic costs of predator losses, public perception of predator control, and the
in the same manner that the environmentalists predictions made in the Leopold Report about
used ecology. They argued that impartial, drastic change proved prophetic. Another
uncontestable science supported their claims. public relations disaster—the 1971 discovery
They tried to quantify the dollars lost each by a Boy Scout troop of 24 eagle carcasses
year to predators. One frequently-cited study near a poisoned bait station in Wyoming—
placed the figure at $3 million for Utah alone brought intense public scrutiny on the federal
(Nielson and Curle 1970). Wool growers program (Schueler 1991). Congressional
believed they could not raise sheep without hearings followed, as did lawsuits brought
the assistance of a federal predator control by environmental groups in an attempt to
program, and they feared for the future of stop the use of predacides. In July 1971, U.S.
their industry. The declining numbers of sheep Department of the Interior Secretary Rogers
ranchers across the nation reinforced this Morton announced that a new committee (the
concern. Vern Vivion, president of the National Cain Committee, named after chairman Stanley
Wool Growers Association, worried that “the A. Cain and including A. Starker Leopold, 4
predator problem throughout the nation is so other biologists and a political scientist) would
serious it could be the straw that breaks our investigate the use of poisons and analyze the
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progress made by the DWS in implementing Carson, R. 1962. Silent spring. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Massachusetts, USA.
the recommendations of the Leopold Report
Cawley, R. M. 1993. Federal land, western anger: the sagebrush
(Cain et al. 1972, Feldman 1996).
Just as the Cain Committee released its report
in February 1972, President Richard Nixon
issued an executive order banning the use of
predacides on public lands. Nixon explained his
order as a political decision—based on changing
values—as much as a scientific one. “Americans
today set high value on the preservation of
wildlife,” Nixon explained. “The old notion
that the only good predator is a dead one is no
longer acceptable as we understand that even
the animals and birds have their own value in
maintaining the balance of nature” (Council on
Environmental Quality 1972:365).
Although the changes put in place in the
aftermath of the Leopold Report had updated
the philosophy behind the federal predator
control program, these reforms had failed to
win support for the program from the wider
public. Environmentalists succeeded in getting
their critique of the federal predator control
program into the mainstream, while ranchers
had not been able to mount a successful
defense of this practice. This failure had grave
consequences: the ranchers were shut out of
the policy-making process. President Nixon
responded to the source of public pressure that
pushed the hardest. Public opinion, as much as
science, had determined the shape of federal
predator control policy.
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